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We Represent the Law Prof Guild
Scott A. Anderson*
Stanley Fish describes academia as both an ivory tower and a common
job. Academics are free to pursue a life devoted to “the particular
pleasures” of contemplation, but are not free to pursue that life beyond their
professional job description.1 In particular, academics may not advocate for
students to adopt particular moral stances or to take political action. “The
academy is the place where knowledge is advanced, where the truth about
matters physical, conceptual and social is sought. That’s the job . . . .”2 So,
for Fish, “contemplation as an end in itself” is permitted, but
“contemplation as a preliminary to action” is not the professor’s job.3
Fish’s description of academia as “just a job” is provided from inside
the institution. Fish ensures that any limitations on professors come from
within the world of academia, not from the world of democracy.4 The
Kuhnian “relevant community” is the guild of professors, and the guild of
professors determines the constitutive and regulative principles for it: “what
is true is what the guild says is true.”5
Fish wants his “just a job” description of academia to apply to the legal
academy.6 Unfortunately, it doesn’t. The law professors’ guild has
determined that not only contemplative, but also practical knowledge and
skills must be imparted to its students. Indeed, the American Bar
Association—the accrediting body for all American law schools—requires
that law students be given skills that could help them to pass the bar exam7
and to practice law.8 So, being a law professor is not just an academic job;
it is a job that prepares its students to enter and to succeed in another
profession: the profession of law.
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STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 84) (on file with the FIU Law Review).
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Id. (manuscript at 85).
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Id. (manuscript at 87).
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Id. (manuscript at 96).
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Id.
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Id. (manuscript at 87).
7 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS §301 (201314),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2013_2014_
standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf. .
8
Id. at § 302.
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Law professors “offer[] knowledge and skills to students who wish to
receive them”9 in order to practice law outside of the academy. Law
professors are not training their students to become professors; they are
training their students to become lawyers. For this reason, Fish may wish to
amend his “just a job” description of academia to exclude those academic
professions that train students to enter other professions. This would be
quite a concession, however, because the amended description would not
apply to Fish’s own institution: the law school. Additionally, the amended
description would not apply to schools that train students for other
professions, including medical schools and seminaries.
Fish could maintain his “just a job” description of academia, but only
by artificially reducing membership in the law professors’ guild. Fish could
argue that only persons like him—those with PhDs and not law degrees—
are the appropriate members of the “relevant community.” This would
bolster Fish’s argument that the legal academy is only about contemplation,
but it would remove from the guild the vast majority of current law
professors. A less restrictive approach would be to claim that only socalled “doctrinal” professors are members of the “relevant community.”
Unfortunately, this reduction would be misguided on two fronts. On the
one hand, “doctrinal” professors who teach bar examination subjects (such
as Contracts, Torts, and Criminal Procedure) would have to be excluded.
They would be imparting the knowledge and skills needed to pass the bar
exam, a motive extrinsic to “advancing knowledge and discovering truth.”10
On the other hand, excluding so-called “skills” professors from the
“relevant community” would run roughshod over the actual standards
imposed via the ABA by the law professors’ guild.
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